) (H Γ is discussed in the paper for the set of one and the same players' strategies. The players make their choice sitting round the table and have the opportunity to coordinate only the meanings of utilities in every situation. Therefore the players' payoffs are given by 2 2 × matrixes. A notion "the equalized situation" in mixed strategies which is at the same time the equilibrium is introduced. The theorem has been proved, which establishes the conditions of existance of an equalized situation in the given game. In the case of the existence algorithm is constructed. If equalized situation doesn't exist in the game, then there exists the equilibrium situation in the pure strategies and it is possible to find it by analysis of situations. 
Introduction
Mathematical methods in the normative theory of making decisions are used for two purposes: for clearing the existing reality and for estabishment of its rational behaviour. In the process of making collective choice the new fundamental problems are rising. In the last period of time the problem of democracy has got a lot of interest in social -economic and political sciences and the question is if we can define the correct methods of individual decissions collection in order to get a correct collective choise.
Every collective choice (decission) mainly takes place in the case of different interest of individuals. In this case the process of collective choice is a game. In that case if they can not come to an agreement on choosing strategies (variants, alternatives) the process of making collective choise is a non-cooperative game.
Game theory is a modern field of making decisions [6] . For the time being, non-cooperative, e.i. strategic games for making collective choise strategic modelling is taking place not only in economics, business and management, but in many other fields of science and life. For example, in social field [3] , in politics [1, 7, 8, 9] , in security [2, 5] , in information theory [10] and others.
Suppose there is a collective that consists of n individuals }. ,... Dyadic games is a significant class of noncooperative games, where a player has two strategies. In the case of two players one of the well-known game is for example the "Prisoner's Dilemma". They are used for modelling simple situations taking from the socialpolitical life, where the elements of competition, coordination and cooperation participate in the form of different variants: vote or not, confess or not, sign or not and etc.
Non-cooperative dyadic games have a certain place in the books and articles published in the following fields of study: Game Theory, Biology, Psychology and so on.
In the case of scalar utilities, dyadic games arc described in detail for example Vorob'ev's book [12] . In such games, the conditions of Nash's equilibrium existing in a completely mixed strategies are given by analytical relations.
In this paper, special class of dyadic games is discussed, that is to say. we assume that we have a finite set of players 
The main part
In (1) 
In this case game (3) is the same as the following bimatrix game 5) is the same as the following (7) should be taken place (Borov'ev [12] ). Therefore, the rational behind the desire and tendency of the players is to attain equalized situations, since a tendency towards equalized situation can be viewed as a kind of optimal behavior.
Let the following equation be used for
where N i ∈ and the sum i+1 acquired by n -modulo. 
Moreover, the mixed strategy of the player ), 1 , (
defined in the folloving way:
In other case in ) (H Γ game there exists an equilibrium situation in pure strategies.
Proof. According the to definition the situation ) ,..., , (
and only if the following equalities takes place:
Hence one obtains
Therefore, for the existence of an equalized situation in ) (H Γ game it is necessary and sufficient to fullfil one of these two conditions
From these conditions, (8) is equal to the following inequalities:
Now prove on the contrary. Let
Let show, that this fraction is not more than 1. Let us suppose that it is more than 1:
This is controdiction to the assumption
We'll obtain the same when 0 ) 1 ( ≤ Δ ) (H Γ game with matrixes of payoff. Let, write the necessary formulae for analysis of (3) game. As we see, this game is different from the ordinary non-cooperative game -bimatrix Γ game (4).
) (H Γ
According to our notes for (3) ) (H Γ game we write: 
The equalized situation in ) (H Γ game may exist no only in completely mixed strategies. We shal show it in the following example. 
According to Theorem we obtain 2 1 , ) 2 (
game the equalized situation is the following:
The players' payoffs
are equal to: 
. Hence the conditions of Theorem are not fulfilled. The equilibrium situation in pure strategies exists in game
So, the players' payoffs are . 2 , 2 , 1
Applications
In an organization of a teaching process of a subject at University we mean the functioning of the organizational T system, that contains } ,..., 2 , 1 { n S = group of students and P -professor. Some individuals (players) who are having different interest take part in T system. They canb choose one or seweral actionsstrategies. Choosing the relevant strategies finally they get some utilities. Players aim is to choose the optimal strategies, using them they will get the maximal utilities. 
Thus a bimatrix game has the following form
In this game (11) and (12) games have got one and the same equilibrium situations. Now, in the situation of an exam for the purpose of students' optimal behaviour of a group } ,..., 2 , 1 { n S = let them sit around the round table according to the given row and play (12) model so that one of the students sitting next to each other performs a role of a professor. In this case each of them will perform both roles as a student and as a professor as well.
Let consider three students' case There we'll find players' optimal strategies analogically to an example 3 game ) (H Γ will be defined the same way for any number of students. Overall, it is obvious that a student should study properly otherwise he will not get a positive grade.
Conclusion
The dyadic non-cooperative ) (H Γ game model which is discussed in this paper can be used in socialeconomic and political situations for making strategic decisions, where players share a unique set of strategies. Nash's equilibrium situation in the mixed strategies is the equalized situation. The theorem gives the opportunity to find the criterium of the existence of an equilibrium situation of ) (H Γ game in the mixed strategies and its finding method. In ) (H Γ game it is possible to exist: 1) an equilibrium situation in the mixed and pure strategies; 2) an equilibrium situation only in mixed strategies; 3) an equilibrium situation only in pure strategies. In ) (H Γ game in the pure strategies in case of finding equilibrium situation, we are making the situations in the pure strategies and check each of them. In the case of two players ) (H Γ game is a 2 2 × bimatrix Γ game. The players' conditions of optimal mixed strategies existence in Γ game is written.
Relevant examples are solved is and ) (H Γ game's application for finite amount of players' is discussed.
